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erBehavioral economics provides an empirically informed perspective on how individuals make
decisions, including the important realization that even subtle features of the environment can have
meaningful impacts on behavior. This commentary provides examples from the literature and recent
government initiatives that incorporate concepts from behavioral economics in order to improve
health, decision making, and government efﬁciency. The examples highlight the potential for
behavioral economics to improve the effectiveness of public health policy at low cost. Although
incorporating insights from behavioral economics into public health policy has the potential to
improve population health, its integration into government public health programs and policies
requires careful design and continual evaluation of such interventions. Limitations and drawbacks of
the approach are discussed.
(Am J Prev Med 2016;50(5S1):S13–S19) & 2016 American Journal of Preventive Medicine. All rights reserved.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).IntroductionThe assumption in neoclassical or mainstreameconomics that individuals act to maximize theirlong-term best interest, have stable preferences,
and are consistent rational actors has served as a useful
benchmark for predicting behavior. This model of human
behavior has inﬂuenced the design of public health policy,
including providing information about risks, taxing
harmful substances such as tobacco and alcohol, and
subsidizing preventive care such as vaccinations.
Yet, these traditional economic incentives sometimes
prove ineffective. The ﬁeld of behavioral economics
differs from neoclassical economics in that it focuses
on the ways in which rationality may be limited or
bounded, and inﬂuenced by factors such as impulsive-
ness, limited willpower, social norms, and the context inﬁce of the Associate Director for Policy, CDC, Atlanta,
rtment of Policy Analysis and Management, Department of
ornell University, Ithaca, New York; and 3Social and
ences Team, General Services Administration, Washington,
umbia
rrespondence to: Jennifer L. Matjasko, PhD, Chapin Hall at
Chicago, 1313 East 60th Street, Chicago IL 60637. E-mail:
pinhall.org.
is part of the supplement issue titled The Use of Economics
.S. Public Health Policy.
$36.00
i.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2016.02.007
ican Journal of Preventive Medicine. All rights reserved. T
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.orgwhich choices are made. The behavioral economics
approach is heavily based on and informed by related
literature in ﬁelds like psychology and neuroscience.1–4 It
should be noted that this commentary uses the term
“behavioral economics” for the sake of brevity, but draws
upon the broad, multidisciplinary literature when dis-
cussing its applications to public health policy. The focus
of the behavioral economics approach is to better predict
and understand people’s actions, with the goal of devis-
ing more effective public policy.
This commentary provides a broad overview of key
ﬁndings from behavioral economics and describes its
potential to meaningfully inform public health and
prevention policy. It provides examples of its successful
application to public health and prevention, illustrating
its ability to improve both the effectiveness and efﬁciency
of policies through well-designed interventions. How-
ever, the approach is not a silver bullet; limitations of the
approach and obstacles to its more widespread use are
also described.Recent Efforts to Integrate Behavioral
Economics Into Policymaking
Governments worldwide are increasingly incorporat-
ing the behavioral economics approach into policy-
making. In 2010, the U.K. Cabinet Ofﬁce created thehis is an open access
/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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to such work.3–5 In 2014, the U.S. government created
the White House Social and Behavioral Science
Team.6 Both of these organizations have been referred
to as “nudge” units; nudge was deﬁned by Richard
Thaler and Cass Sunstein7(p6) in their book of the same
name as “any aspect of the choice architecture that
alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without
forbidding any options or signiﬁcantly changing their
economic incentives.” The use of behavioral econom-
ics is spreading beyond these individual units and
inﬂuencing policy throughout government. The U.S.
Ofﬁce of Management and Budget has directed agen-
cies to experiment with interventions that have low
cost but the potential to increase efﬁcacy and efﬁ-
ciency of federal policy and programs8; interven-
tions derived from behavioral economics are often
prime candidates. Furthermore, the Obama Admin-
istration recently issued an Executive Order encour-
aging federal agencies to incorporate insights from the
behavioral and social sciences in order to better serve
the American people. Other nudge units have beenTable 1. A Sample of Key Departures From Rationality and The
Deviation from rationality
Time inconsistent preferences (e.g., hyperbolic discounting)
People tend to prefer more immediate gratiﬁcation, even at the
expense of longer-run well-being. This may lead to preference
reversals, such as people repeatedly quitting and then resuming
risky health behaviors, and dietary cycles of binging and purging.
Bounded rationality
Rationality in decision making is curtailed by a lack of information,
cognitive limitations, and a ﬁnite amount of time to make a
decision. People may also have ﬁnite amounts of willpower and
experience decision fatigue.
Status quo bias
People exhibit inertia, and tend not to deviate from the default
option or reverse their earlier decisions. For example, many people
stick with default options for organ donation, retirement savings,
and health insurance plans.
Framing effects
People react to the same tradeoff in different ways depending on
whether the possible outcomes are presented as losses or gains.
Some people respond differently to risk presented as 80% chance
of survival versus 20% chance of death.
Availability heuristic
People judge the odds of a given event occurring based on how
readily an example comes to mind. Diseases or conditions faced
by a friend or which are the topic news coverage and advertising
tend to increase individual’s perception of their personal risk of
the disease.
(Mis)perceptions of social norms
People want to conform to social norms but often misperceive the
norms/behaviors of others. For example, many college students
overestimate how much alcohol their peers drink.
Note: See also Samson19 and Pinto et al.20created in Australia, Denmark, and by the World
Bank.
The Behavioral Economics Approach
Table 1 lists key behavioral economics concepts that are
the most relevant for public health policy. They include
time-inconsistent preferences, bounded rationality, sta-
tus quo bias, framing effects, availability heuristic, and
social norms.19–22 The Table explains each concept, and
for each provides an example of how it informs public
health policy.
For example, neoclassical economics assumes that
people are not affected by the superﬁcial framing of
probabilistic information. A decision maker should, for
example, respond similarly to a description of alterna-
tives to address an outbreak of a new disease expected to
affect 600 people whether it is stated as 200 people saved
or 400 people die—the objective risk is identical in both
descriptions. Yet, behavioral economics has found that
the framing of risks and probabilities matters; people
may react differently to positive frames (such as their Related Behavioral Economics Applications
Possible behavioral economics application(s)
Offer pre-commitment devices that allow people to restrict the
choices of their future selves in order to increase the probability of
adhering to the healthy behavior. Research suggests that people
are more successful in quitting smoking and losing weight when at
the outset they post a monetary bond that would be forfeited in the
future should they fail.7,9–11
Simplify how information is presented in order to make it easy for
people to use. Simple checklists for important multistep
procedures may be useful in preventing surgical errors and airline
crashes.12
Make the healthy option a default option, such as including sliced
apples rather than french fries as a side in children’s meals.13
Limit portion sizes.
Uptake may be improved by using gains-framed messages and
incentives for encouraging healthy behaviors and loss-framed
messages for encouraging use of health screenings.14–18
Prime a behavior by providing examples relevant for that
population. For example, youth may be more responsive to a drug
prevention program after the death of a celebrity from drug
overdose.
Avoid conveying the message that large fractions of the population
are engaged in risky health behaviors (especially to teenagers and
others who may be easily inﬂuenced by bandwagon or peer
effects).
www.ajpmonline.org
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chance of dying).1 In one study that involved a hypo-
thetical scenario involving cancer, patients, graduate
students, and physicians were all more likely to elect
surgery over irradiation if the consequences were framed
in terms of the probability of living rather than the
probability of dying.23
The U.K.’s BIT succinctly describes some of the key
lessons of their approach with the acronym MIND-
SPACE (Table 2).3 Some of the concepts overlap with
those in Table 1 (e.g., time-inconsistent preferences, loss
aversion, and social norms), but other concepts are new,
such as the importance of the messenger. The BIT argues
that simple policy interventions based on these principles
have the potential to achieve signiﬁcant impact at low
cost.3 For example, organ donation rates have been low
in countries that require donors to opt in (i.e., take action
to be listed as a potential donor). Historically, these low
consent rates were interpreted as unwillingness to serve
as a donor, but behavioral scientists perceived that it
might be the result of inertia or the inﬂuence of the
default assumption that people do not want to be donors.
When an online experiment changed the default, and
made default donor status opt-out rather than opt-in,
organ donation rates nearly doubled (from 42% to 82%),
and a follow-up survey indicated that it raised willingnessTable 2. MINDSPACE: Key Lessons of the Behavioral Insight
Team Approach
Acronym Stands for Explanation
M Messenger We are heavily inﬂuenced by who
conveys the information
I Incentives People respond to incentives,
and in particular they exhibit loss
aversion
N Norms People are inﬂuenced by their
perception of what others do
D Defaults People are heavily inﬂuenced by
default options
S Salience People are particularly
inﬂuenced by incentives that are
visible and new
P Priming People can be inﬂuenced by
subconscious cues
A Affect Emotions shape decisions
C Commitment People with time-inconsistent
preferences may seek
pre-commitment devices
E Ego People prefer to act in ways that
make them feel better about
themselves
Source: U.K.’s Behavioral Insights Team.3–5
May 2016to serve as a donor (i.e., making it opt-out did not simply
force unaware people onto the donor rolls).24
The Role of Behavioral Economics in
Improving Public Health Policy
From the beginning, health has been recognized as a
fertile area for applying nudges. The subtitle of the book
Nudge7 is Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and
Happiness. In their discussion of health behaviors, Thaler
and Sunstein propose new nudges in health, such as
simplifying decision making in Medicare. In fact, section
1511 of the Affordable Care Act requires large employers
to automatically enroll workers into health insurance;
similar to the previous example on organ donation, this
switched from an opt-in to an opt-out system in order to
harness the power of defaults. We will provide examples
in which concepts from behavioral economics were
applied to public health policy and led to improvements
in health attitudes and behaviors. A summary of these
applications is provided in Table 1.
Nudges can be effective because people are inﬂuenced by
stimuli that are visible and new; thus, at least in theory, small
changes can lead to behavior modiﬁcation. Several studies
have found that simply prompting (nudging) individuals to
make a plan increases the probability of the subject
eventually engaging in the prompted health behavior, such
as immunizations, healthy eating, and cancer screening.25
For example, one study found that e-mailing patients
appointment times and locations for their next inﬂuenza
vaccination increased vaccination rates by 36%.26 Another
intervention was even simpler. Rather than assigning a date
and time for the patient to be vaccinated, patients were
simply mailed a card that asked the patient to write down
the day or day and time they planned to get the inﬂuenza
vaccine (they were also sent the day and time of the free
inﬂuenza vaccine clinics).27 Relative to a control condition
(people who only received the information about the day
and time of the clinics), those prompted to write down the
day and time they planned to get the inﬂuenza vaccine were
4.2 percentage points (12.7%) more likely to receive the
vaccine at those clinics. Those prompted to write down the
date but not the time were not signiﬁcantly more likely to be
vaccinated at the clinics. Decision heuristics, such as high-
lighting consensus, may also help. Highlighting descriptive
norms among a group of trusted experts, or priming (e.g.,
that 90% of doctors agree that vaccines are safe) can
signiﬁcantly reduce public concern about (childhood)
vaccines and promote intentions to vaccinate.28
The signiﬁcant inﬂuence of framing14 has been demon-
strated in many public health domains, such as messaging
about blood transfusion,15 smoking cessation,16 sunscreen
use,17 and mammography utilization.18 In particular, gains-
Matjasko et al / Am J Prev Med 2016;50(5S1):S13–S19S16framed messages (i.e., emphasizing the health gains of a
behavior or treatment) were more likely to have a positive
impact on the attitudes toward activities targeting prevention
(e.g., blood safety, sunscreen use, smoking cessation). Loss-
based messages may be more effective at encouraging
screening behaviors, such as mammography screening.18
This points to the importance of testing messages for the
uptake of preventive services among varying subgroups,
many of which are now covered without cost-sharing as a
result of the coverage of preventive services mandated in the
Affordable Care Act.
Detailed Illustrative Examples
Self-management, including patient responsibility for adher-
ence to prescription drugs, is a key component of prevention
for many chronic diseases and conditions. Reﬂecting this,
prescription drug coverage is one of the Essential Health
Beneﬁts speciﬁed in the Affordable Care Act. Some insurance
plans take the neoclassical economic approach by reducing
ﬁnancial barriers and covering certain prescription drugs with
little to no cost sharing for their beneﬁciaries. By reducing cost
barriers to the drugs, the policy aims to increase the likelihood
that individuals will obtain and take the covered drug, and
subsequently prevent future adverse events. In this vein, an
insurer in North Carolina eliminated generic medication
copayments and reduced copayment for branded medica-
tions, and found that medication adherence improved by 1.5
percentage points for patients with hypertension.29 However,
despite the removal of cost barriers, some patients were still
not adherent. Medication adherence requires a complex
sequence of behaviors that must be maintained over time.
Patients must maintain a valid prescription for the medi-
cation. They must ﬁll their prescription at a pharmacy. Then,
they must understand and adhere to the recommended
dosage and timing. In the course of a busy life, there are
many factors that can cause people to miss a dose or fail to
reﬁll their prescriptions.
Behavioral economics can inform the design of inter-
ventions to increase the utilization of a covered service
that accounts for the complexity of human behavior. In
the case of prescription drugs for chronic conditions,
nudges (such as automated text messaging) can remind
individuals to take their medication. An automatic reﬁll
of prescriptions is seen as a way to harness the power of
defaults to increase medication adherence; automatic
reﬁlls could be made the default for prescription medi-
cations for chronic conditions.
Numerous nudges have also sought to improve diet,
physical activity, and obesity. The ﬁrst example given
in the book Nudge concerns changing the choice archi-
tecture (i.e., the environment in which choices are made)
in school cafeterias to improve children’s diets.7Subsequent research has found that minor alterations
to school cafeterias to increase the convenience and
appeal of healthier options can increase fruit and
vegetable consumption of schoolchildren (e.g., changes
as simple as giving interesting names to the vegetable
options), although there is little information of the
durability of these effects.30 In addition, some restaurant
chains have altered the default drinks and side dishes in
children’s meals to healthier options31 (e.g., changing the
default beverage from soda pop to water, or the default
side from french fries to apple slices).
Thaler and Sunstein7 also point to StickK.com, a
website where people can post forfeitable bonds (or
“deposit contracts”) that help them adhere to a healthy
lifestyle (e.g., lose weight or exercise). The problem that
many consumers face is that they have time-inconsistent
preferences; that is, they may want to adhere to a healthy
lifestyle but frequently succumb to the temptation for
immediate gratiﬁcation (Table 1). One solution is to offer
such people commitment devices—the ability to better
inﬂuence or even restrict the choices of their future selves
so that they adhere to a healthy lifestyle. The StickK.com
website offers such commitment devices: In a moment of
willpower people can post bonds that will be returned to
them if they achieve their goals (such as weight loss or
smoking cessation) but are forfeited otherwise. Because
of the phenomenon of loss aversion—people are more
motivated to avoid losing something than they are to win
something—such bonds may be particularly inﬂuential
in helping people stick to their resolutions. Research that
experimentally manipulated the choice architecture of
the StickK.com website found that people nudged to
undertake a longer exercise commitment tended to
choose longer exercise commitments and complete more
weeks of exercise.9 This is once again evidence of the
power of status quo bias and default options (Tables 1
and 2). Research on the effectiveness of deposit contracts
for weight loss (not involving StickK.com) has found
mixed results; these programs may experience high
attrition10 and weight loss that ranges from modest10 to
more substantial.11
Commitment strategies have also been offered to help
smokers quit. One program in the Philippines encour-
aged smokers to deposit funds into a savings account; if
the smoker quit (which would be veriﬁed by urine test)
the money would be returned, but if the smoker failed to
quit then the money would be donated to charity.32
Results were mixed; take-up of the commitment strategy
was low (only 11%) and two thirds of those who
voluntarily deposited money still failed to quit. However,
those who were offered the commitment strategy were
roughly one third more likely to have quit smoking 1 year
later than the control group.www.ajpmonline.org
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the optimal design of incentives, taking into account the
phenomena of loss aversion, salience, framing, social
norms, and the desire of people with time-inconsistent
preferences for commitment devices (Tables 1 and 2).
Increasing the amount of incentives can be expensive, but
it may be possible to increase behavior change by altering
the design of incentives without increasing their magni-
tude. Halpern et al.33 tested whether ﬁnancial incentives
for smoking cessation were more inﬂuential if they were
structured as rewards or deposit contracts; both were
compared to usual care. They found in a randomized
experiment that the reward option had higher uptake
than the deposit option, but the deposit-based programs
resulted in greater behavioral change than the reward
option. Thus, reward programs may achieve greater
participation (i.e., because of loss aversion, people tend
to be reluctant to put their own money at risk), but
deposit contracts can have bigger results, because once
participants have “skin in the game,” loss aversion helps
motivate them to lose more weight. More research is
needed to determine the optimal design of incentives for
speciﬁc subgroups of interest (e.g., those of low SES).
Important Considerations in Applying
Nudges to Public Health Policy
To design a behaviorally informed policy intervention, such
as a nudge, it is necessary to ﬁrst understand the decision-
making process around the targeted behavior. Two guides to
this audit process are the behavioral diagnosis and design
process (part of the Administration for Children and
Families’ Behavioral Interventions to Advance Self-
Sufﬁciency Project34) and the nudge development process.35
Both encourage problem identiﬁcation, using data to
diagnose the problem, auditing people’s decision-making
process, and identifying any deviations from, or obstacles to,
rational decision making. The identiﬁcation of these limi-
tations and obstacles then informs the design of the
interventions.36 In fact, Berg and Gigerenzer36 suggest that
policy could beneﬁt from learning what factors drive
behaviors and then designing nudges to change those
behaviors. Furthermore, any nudge-like interventions—
especially new ones or ones applied in new contexts or to
new populations—should undergo rigorous testing. Exper-
imentation, ideally an RCT, is required to evaluate whether
the behavioral interventions work and to measure the
beneﬁts relative to the costs.3
Policymakers may have a role of not only developing
nudges to encourage healthy behavior but to also
preventing ﬁrms from nudging consumers toward
unhealthy behavior.37 Firms largely control the choice
architecture at the point of sale; for example,May 2016supermarkets place candy and magazines—possible
impulse buys—near their checkout counters, exploiting
consumers’ impulsiveness after their willpower has been
depleted by a long shopping trip. Restaurants set defaults
such as portion sizes and included side dishes that
consumers may accept because of status quo bias. Menus
may be designed to cause framing effects that proﬁt the
restaurant. Advertisements may inﬂuence consumers’
perceptions of social norms. Regulation regarding con-
sistent disclosure of terms and the standardization of
products may be appropriate in markets such as that for
health insurance in which choices are numerous, com-
plex, and hard to compare and in which mistakes can
cause considerable loss or harm to consumers.
Caveats
Behavioral economics has the potential to improve the
effectiveness of public health policy, but the approach has
limitations.38 First, the deﬁnition of a nudge is somewhat
vague and inconsistent.39 Some interventions presented as
nudges are perhaps better described as traditional econom-
ics approaches; for example, some simply provide informa-
tion, or alter marginal costs or marginal beneﬁts.36 For
example, the BIT’s endorsement of lowering salt in food
and alcohol through voluntary agreement with industry is
simply an endorsement of a health guideline. The inﬂuence
of defaults may simply reﬂect high time costs to acquiring
information or switching between options, which is per-
fectly consistent with neoclassical economics. In general,
behavioral economics is not a comprehensive alternative to
neoclassical economics; it is more ad hoc.
Behavioral economics may also risk a slippery slope to
paternalism, as it argues that it may be in people’s own
interest to have their choices restricted by government.
By arguing that it can help people make better choices, it
presupposes that policymakers know better than indi-
viduals what is in the individuals’ own interest. More-
over, it can be hard to delineate when these interventions
become coercive (i.e., when a nudge becomes a shove).
Because behavioral economics is a relatively new ﬁeld,
the research literature remains thin. Many studies involve
relatively small samples, which in many cases are also
idiosyncratic samples of convenience from which it is
difﬁcult to generalize. There has been a lack of replication
of ﬁndings. As in all ﬁelds, there may be publication bias;
studies ﬁnding that behavioral economics approaches are
effective may be more likely to be published than those
ﬁnding no effect. When nudges have been evaluated, they
often have either small effects, short-lived effects, or
both.37,39 Small effect sizes can still be meaningful,
especially if multiplied over many individuals, but these
beneﬁts must be compared to the costs; in general, there
Matjasko et al / Am J Prev Med 2016;50(5S1):S13–S19S18is a lack of information about the cost effectiveness of
these approaches.39 There is also little information about
long-run (as opposed to short-run) behavior changes in
response to these policies. Nudges may only work when
they are new and particularly salient (i.e., they may lose
effectiveness over time), and they may need to be tailored
to speciﬁc subpopulations.
For some important decisions, it may be considered
unethical to inﬂuence individuals using behavioral eco-
nomics techniques. For example, one randomized experi-
ment found that defaults had a large impact on end-of-
life care choices among terminally ill patients.40 The
percentage of patients choosing comfort-only care over
life-extending care was 43% among those whose advance
directive form had a default of life-extending care, 61%
among those whose advance directive form had no
default, and 77% among those whose form had a default
of comfort-only care. The substantial impact of defaults
on such an important issue as whether a terminally ill
patient continues to receive curative care or not raises
serious ethical issues.
Loewenstein and colleagues41 caution that policy can
sometimes get ahead of science. There is a risk of
applying behavioral economics approaches before sufﬁ-
ciently understanding the context and effects of the
application. Thus, as ﬁndings from behavioral economics
are integrated into public health, it is important to keep a
vigilant eye on the evidence. Some nudges may be
implemented hastily and imperfectly. Applied behavioral
scientists have consistently emphasized that interven-
tions should be continually evaluated and reﬁned.35,42
Through such evaluations and evidence-based reﬁne-
ments, the goal of improving health for low monetary
cost is more likely to be achieved.Publication of this article has been sponsored by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Ofﬁce of
the Associate Director for Policy. The ﬁndings and conclusions
in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the ofﬁcial position of CDC, the U.S. Social
and Behavioral Sciences Team, or the General Services
Administration.
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